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THE FOLKLORE OF FEATHERBEDDING
HENRY KAISER
EATHERBEDDING is not a word to be found in the standard dic-
tionaries. It is a slang word,' an opprobrious reference to various
forms of human reaction to technological advancements.2 It is
a contemptuous, fighting word to those who purport to believe that
economic waste is not to be tolerated in our modem industrial society.
It is used indiscriminately to describe a multitude of activities that
are said to prevent the use of more efficient methods or to secure the
employment of useless and unnecessary labor.' Ordinarily the epithet
I The word "featherbedding" is given as an example of "union slang" in Mencken,
The American Language: Supplement II, 776 (1948), and is defined there to mean
"getting pay for work not done."
The word is listed under both "labor union activities" and "railroad work" in
Berry and Van den Bark, The American Thesaurus of Slang 494, 728 (2d ed., 1953).
It is there defined to mean "requiring the management to put an extra man on a
job where he is not needed in order to spread available work."
The word is also listed in Horton, Ripley and Schnapper, Dictionary of Modern
Economics 125 (1948), as "A term of opprobrium applied to the practice of em-
ployees who limit their maximum production for personal or union reasons."
In a recent newspaper account of "featherbedding" and other activities of unions
in the New York City entertainment business, the following definitions are given:
"'Featherbedding' is the technique of forcing an employer to hire men for whom
there is no real job. 'Padding' means using more men than are needed. The 'schmear'
is the custom that makes it seem advisable for an employer to pay a gratuity to
an employee in excess of wages." New York Times, p. 13, col. 1 (Feb. 8, 1954).
2 Two recent studies of anti-featherbedding legislation define the word as follows:
"Featherbedding is a form of resistance to technological change, a phenomenon
as old as civilization itself." Aaron, Governmental Restraints on Featherbedding, 5
Stan. L. Rev. 680 (1953).
"Featherbedding is a method of creating or spreading employment by un-
necessarily maintaining or increasing the number of employees or the time used to
complete a particular job." Note, Featherbedding and Taft-Hartley, 52 Col. L. Rev.
1020 (1952).
3 At least nine forms of activities by unions to make work for their members have
been identified: (1) limiting daily or weekly output; (2) indirectly limiting the speed
of work; (3) controlling the quality of work; (4) requiring time-consuming methods
of work; (5) requiring that unnecessary work be done or that work be done more
than once; (6) regulating the number of men in a crew or on a machine, or re-
quiring the employment of unnecessary men; (7) requiring that work be done by
members of a given skilled craft; (8) prohibiting employers or foremen from doing
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is applied only to the actions of organized labor, though the concept
behind it admits of no such limitation.4 But whatever its intended
scope, featherbedding is a symbol that tends to impede intelligent
consideration of the social and economic impact of technological
change and to produce punitive legislation of a most unrealistic
nature.
Around the featherbedding symbol has developed an elaborate
folklore. Always the emphasis is upon extreme situations, upon a
"parade of horribles," wherein individuals are paid for doing no
work or where the work performed has no discernible value to the
employer or to society. Such instances are said to be patent forms
of economic waste that drain millions of unnecessary dollars from
supine employers. And these employers are described as weak-kneed,
possessing little knowledge of their own business, and lacking "both
the shrewdness for dickering with union officials and the patience to
study their own contracts." 5 So great is said to be the economic
waste that the public interest demands that these employers, who are
either ineffective or collusive in their relations with unions, be pro-
tected from the featherbedding demands of union negotiators. The
processes of collective bargaining are not to be trusted. The feather-
bedding demands of unions, it is concluded, must be outlawed if
we are to enjoy an efficient economic system wherein men are paid
only for the necessary work that they actually perform.
But before we concede the desirability of outlawing featherbed-
ding and legislating efficiency, certain assumptions, implications and
repercussions of the prevailing folklore deserve examination. At the
outset, it may be categorically asserted that productive efficiency is by
no means the exclusive or even the most desirable value of our society.
Some, for example, doubtless consider and can statistically prove that
journeymen's work; and (9) retarding or prohibiting the use of machines and labor
saving devices by pursuing policies of obstruction, competition or control. Slichter,
Union Policies and Industrial Management 166 (1941).
4Policies which restrict output or the adoption of more efficient methods or
which require the employment of unnecessary manpower frequently are adopted
by management. Moreover, it has been said that nonunion men tend to restrict
production more than unionists since they do not operate under collective agree-
ments which usually come to public notice and hence are subject to public con-
demnation. Leiserson, The Economics of Restriction of Output, in Mathewson,
Restriction of Output Among Unorganized Workers at 160, 163 (1931). See, in
general, Stern, Resistances to the Adoption of Technical Innovations, in Technologi-
cal Trends and National Policy 39 (National Resources Committee, 1937).
5 New York Times, p. 1, col. 4 (Feb. 8, 1954).
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production-wise it is efficient to have employees work conscientiously
for sixty hours a week at fifty cents an hour. Fortunately, however,
we find other, conflicting values more attractive. That these may en-
tail a degree of economic waste cannot be gainsaid. But such waste
is, plainly, a small price to pay for the preservation of the more im-
portant and enduring desiderata of a civilized democracy.
Nor is the economic waste of featherbedding necessarily a con-
scious, evil objective that is irresponsibly sought by those who prac-
tice it. Such activities may reflect something far more justified than
a naked desire by individuals to obtain money without working or to
stand in the way of mechanical progress. Thus a demand for the
performance of "useless" labor may be a crude means of requesting
shorter hours or a spreading of employment opportunities. Opposi-
tion to improved equipment or more efficient methods may constitute
an untutored desire for continued employment or earnings. These
and other "featherbedding" demands, moreover, almost invariably
occur under circumstances where workers are being forced to bear
the total, immediate impact of technological improvements. When
society fails to soften the shock of technological displacement it is
not surprising that workers react individually or through their unions
to demand a more gradual introduction of new machinery or to
request compensation for the displaced individuals.
Featherbedding, thus, is ordinarily a form of adjustment to the
hardships and dislocation which new machines and techniques so
frequently create. It may be that invention and technological change
produce more jobs and higher pay over the long course of time.6 And
it may be that the efforts of workers to offset technological displace-
ment by make-work demands have little lasting effect and fail to
produce any substantial improvement in their employment opportuni-
ties. But workers who are threatened with occupational obsolescence
cannot be expected to concern themselves with the long-run con-
0 It is difficult to measure accurately the effects of labor saving devices upon the
total employment picture. There is considerable opinion to the effect that technologi-
cal improvements result ultimately in greater employment. Slichter, Union Policies
and Industrial Management 575 (1941); Yoder, Labor Economics and Labor Prob-
lems 124 (2d ed., 1939); Marx, Mechanization and Culture (1941). And it is argued
that the labor-displacement effect of these improvements is ultimately balanced by
such compensating factors as reduction of prices and development of new industries.
Douglas and Director, The Problem of Unemployment, c. x (1931). But the Tempor-
ary National Economic Committee concluded that technological improvements do
create unemployment and, by inducing business concentration, hinder operation of
the compensating factor of reduced prices. Anderson, Lorwin and Blair, Technology
in Our Economy 220 (TNEC Monograph 22, 1941).
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sequences of technological improvements. They do not worry about
the ultimate effectiveness of their efforts to maintain their employ-
ment security. Understandably they react instinctively to the threat
of immediate displacement.7
This human reaction, this desire for job-preservation, often has
benefits which are worth preserving despite the economic waste that
may ensue. Maximum hours and minimum wage legislation, un-
employment insurance laws and governmental efforts to facilitate
the mobility of labor are among the ways in which our governments
recognize those values and seek to alleviate the immediate ill-effects
of work displacement. In a real sense such laws involve economic
waste. But that waste is more than counterbalanced by the human
values which are thereby recognized and preserved. And to the
extent that so-called featherbedding activities represent those same
values and supplement social legislation in areas where it is not effec-
tive, the resulting economic waste and lack of pure efficiency are
worth the price.
Some of the values or reasons which may lie behind so-called
featherbedding demands have been well summarized by one labor
leader as follows:
Sometimes these demands arise from the need for doing a competent job;
a carpenter or plumber will demand a helper to conserve his time and pro-
duce a better job. Sometimes they involve considerations of industrial safety;
a road crew will demand, over the employer's protests, that some one be
stationed with a flag to warn traffic, or miners may demand inspection of the
premises, or longshoremen will demand stationing of a lookout, and the like,
for the simple reason that their lives are threatened if these steps are not
taken. Sometimes it is a demand for some measure of leisure; the 8-hour day,
the 5-day week, the paid holiday, the vacation with pay, and pension plans are
all concerned with the understandable and laudable desire of working people
to secure a better life. Yet each of these could be, and perhaps was, resisted
by employers on the ground that they were being asked to pay for something
they did not "need or require." If the employers were right we would still
have 72-hour weeks, 7 days a week, 365 days a year, especially if the em-
ployer's sole desires in these matters had been written into law.8
7 Philip Murray once expressed the attitude of the workers threatened with
mechanical displacement as follows: "Classical economic pronouncements about the
automatic absorption of displaced workers by private industry, whether true in the
long run or not, are just so much dribble to the men and women who are deprived
of their accustomed way of making a livelihood .... As a famous economist once
said, in the long run we are all dead." Hearings before TNEC pursuant to Pub. Res.
113, 76th Cong. 3d Sess. 16,505 (1940).
8 Statement of Woodruff Randolph, President of International Typographical
Union, at Hearings before Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on
proposed revisions of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 83d Cong. 1st
Sess. 630 (1953). See note 19 infra.
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It may be questioned, furthermore, whether all aspects of feather-
bedding really involve economic waste. In the railroad industry, for
example, the practice has developed of paying certain employees for
hours they do not work and for runs they do not make.9 And in
the printing industry an established practice is to pay printers for
certain typesetting which is never even intended to be used.'0 On
the surface both practices would seem to be classic examples of
featherbedding, involving economic waste. Yet in both instances
the practices are merely expressions-indirect expressions to be sure,
but grounded in those industries' history and tradition-of the basic
wage agreement for work actually performed." To overturn them
would be to upset delicate balances achieved by careful and con-
structive negotiations over a period of many years, without any real
difference in production or efficiency.
The condemnation of employee resistance to technological change,
has lost sight of the underlying motivations of such resistance. It
refuses to consider any mitigating circumstances or the possibility that
the economic waste of featherbedding techniques may be outweighed
by other values or may even be non-existent. In the eyes of the anti-
featherbedders, all obstacles placed by labor in the path of greater
efficiency and more production are evil and deserve outlawry.
At the same time this concentration on the resistance of workers
to technological progress ignores the fact that "labor is but one
factor, and not the most important, in the total resistance to the
utilization of invention an dtechnological change."' 2 Employers or
investors may decline to introduce new labor-saving devices for fear
that the costs of obsolescence would be too great. They may
9 Shulman, Labor and the Anti-Trust Laws, 34 Ill. L. Rev. 769, 785 (1940).
10 Randolph, Reproduction in the Printing and Publishing Industry, 4 Lab. L. J.
307 (1953). Randolph states, at 381: "To both employers and employees, the
small cost of reproduction is cheap insurance against chaotic conditions. It is subject
matter for collective bargaining; it is a factor in finally determining both the wage
rates and printing prices. From this mutual agreement to a sound business practice
and sound employment policy, the public derives the indirect benefit of fair prices
at less than the cost of uncontrolled exploitation-there is nothing to pass on the
public, because both employers and employees gain more than they lose by the prac-
tice of reproduction."
11 The Supreme Court has recognized that the reproduction process "has become
a recognized idiosyncrasy of the trade and a customary feature of the wage struc-
ture and work schedule of newspaper printers." American Newspaper Publishers
Assn. v. NLRB, 345 U.S. 100, 103 (1953).
1 Shulman, op. cit. supra note 9, at 785; Millis and Brown, From the Wagner Act
to Taft-Hartley 478 (1950).
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deliberately withhold or suppress patents in order to preserve the
investments in existing plants and machinery. 13 They may hire
more men than are reasonably needed, or staff their payrolls with
workers or relatives who receive pay for performing no work of a
useful character. They may order slow-downs or cut production in
order to avoid loss of profits. Or they may require workers to per-
form more work without corresponding additional pay.14
Sometimes such activities by management are viewed as examples
of good management or as decisions or practices dictated by the
necessities of the business. But they are nonetheless inconsistent with
the ideals of efficiency and progress. By definition they are examples
of featherbedding. As such, they are open to the identical criticisms
of the featherbedding indulged in by workers. It may well be that
there are considerations which outweigh such economic waste as is
caused by these employer practices. But the important point is that
this waste is neither recognized nor condemned by those who sub-
scribe to the folklore of featherbedding.
The approach to the subject of featherbedding is evidenced by
federal legislation. In the Lea Act" it is only the employees and
18 See Stem, Restraints Upon the Utilization of Inventions, 200 Annals. Am. Acad.
Pol. & Soc. Sci. 13 (1938).
14 "An employer counterpart of featherbedding is the 'stretchout,' the purpose
of which is to get workers to perform more work without corresponding additional
pay. If it is bad for the union to ask for pay for work which is not being done,
it must be, from a balanced view, equally bad for the employer to require the union
to agree to extra work without the employer paying for it. But we haven't heard
of anybody recommending legislation which would make it an unfair labor practice
for employers to require the union to agree to a 'stretchout' provision. Nor do we
recommend such legislation. The issues involved in 'featherbedding' and the 'stretch-
out are better left to collective bargaining. ... This is not to say that the 'stretch-
oue or 'featherbedding' is not in some situations carried to unsound extremes, but
it is extremely doubtful whether a legislative rule can be devised which will auto-
matically catch within its provisions only the unsound and leave undisturbed the
sound practices." Statement of Arthur J. Goldberg, General Counsel of Congress of
Industrial Organizations, at Hearings before Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare on proposed revisions of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947,
83d Cong. Ist Sess. 462 (1953).
1560 Stat. 89 (1946), 47 U.S.C.A. § 506 (1946). This statute affects only the broad-
casting industry and was directed solely at the activities of the American Federation
of Musicians and its president, James C. Petrillo. It makes unlawful, by the use or
threat of force or duress, to coerce or compel broadcasters to (1) hire any person
"in excess of the number of employees needed by such licensee to perform actual
services"; (2) pay money to any person "in excess of the number of employees
needed by such licensee to perform actual services"; (3) pay more than once for
services rendered; (4) pay for services "which are not to be performed"; (5) refrain
from broadcasting without paid performers; or (6) refrain from broadcasting foreign
programs.
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the unions that are forbidden from taking action to bring about
the specified featherbedding. Again, in the Taft-Hartley Act, 6 it is
an unfair labor practice only for a labor organization to cause or
attempt to cause an employer to pay for services which are not per-
formed or not to be performed. There has not even been a faint sug-
gestion that similar restrictions be placed upon employers.
If it is undesirable for unions to exercise their economic power
to seek the hiring of unnecessary labor, it is, of necessity, equally
undesirable for employers to exercise their economic power to
accomplish the very same result. From the point of view of the
national interest as reflected in federal legislation on featherbedding,
the evil lies in what is done and not in who has done it. Obviously,
the effect on the national interest is no less harmful where the em-
ployer for what he thinks are good business reasons insists upon
hiring men who perform no useful function than where a union for
what it thinks are good economic reasons insists that such men be
employed.
Congress concededly can deal only with certain evil-doers with-
out encompassing all other potential evil-doers of the same charac-
ter.17 But in terms of the economic theory underlying anti-feather-
bedding statutes, it makes little sense to penalize unions that cause
economic waste while permitting employers to create the identical
waste with impunity. To assume-as the federal statutes do-that
management's normal self-interest will adequately protect the public
in this respect' or that management, in pursuit of profits, has
demonstrated a sensitivity to the public interest and welfare that has
not at least been equalled by that of employees is, obviously, to
legislate a conspicuously unfounded prejudice.
The net effect of the discriminatory, one-sided formulation of the
anti-featherbedding legislation is to throw the weight and prestige
of government behind the employer in an important area of em-
ployer-employee relationships.'? By placing all the criminal and
1661 Star. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. S 158 (b) (6) (1947).
17 United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1947).
1 8 
"As we have seen, Congress could reasonably assume that the employers' normal
self-interest would coincide with the public's interest in this respect, and would be
sufficient in and of itself to prevent this type of practice in the absence of coercion."
Brief of United States, at 94-95, filed in Supreme Court in United States v. Petrillo,
332 U.S. 1 (1947).
19 "The question to be asked and answered is: 'Needed or required by whom?' If
the answer is: 'The employer,' then in a true sense we will no longer have collective
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civil risks on the employees, such legislation gives extraordinary
power to the employer. Thus the Lea Act, in proscribing any effort
by the union to compel radio broadcasters "to employ any person
or persons in excess of the number of employees needed by such li-
censee to perform actual services," gives the broadcasters the danger-
ous power to subject their employees to arbitrary discharge under
threat of the risk of criminal prosecution if the employees try to
take any effective counteraction. All the employers need do is
arbitrarily to discharge a number of employees on the assertion that
they are no longer needed. Any normal resistance on the part of the
employees by peaceful strike, picket or "unfair" listing exposes them
to the possibility of criminal prosecution. The broadcasters have the
statutory privilege of being as contemptuous and dictatorial as the
caprice of any moment may dictate. They need only make the self-
serving declaration that the discharged employees are not "needed."
Even though that declaration might not be sustained in a criminal
trial, the threat of prosecution and jail is real enough to force the
employees into abject submission.
Precisely this situation has developed in the radio broadcasting in-
dustry since the advent of the Lea Act. The American Federation
of Musicians finds itself helpless to protest the increasing number of
discharges of live musicians from radio station staffs.20 The broad-
bargaining. If he says no, that automatically makes the union's demand unlawful and
throws the Government on the employer's side. I insist that any union demand can
be made unlawful under such proposals; the employer can always say, 'I do not
need 5 men for 40 hours but do need 4 men for 50 hours' or 'I do not need 4 men
at $10 a day but do need 8 men at $5.' It would be equally illogical to say that the
union should decide how many men were needed or required, and that the employer
should be required by law to hire them." Statement of Woodruff Randolph, op. cit.
supra note 8, at 630.
20The Supreme Court has recognized the plight of professional musicians caused
by technological replacement. In NLRB v. Gamble Enterprises, Inc., 345 U.S. 117,
119 (1953), the Court noted: "For generations professional musicians have faced a
shortage in the local employment needed to yield them a livelihood. They have been
confronted with the competition of military bands, traveling bands, foreign musicians
on tour, local amateur organizations and, more recently, technological developments
in reproduction and broadcasting."
President Petrillo of the Federation has described the situation in these terms:
"There are some 500,000 juke boxes in the United States and Canada. These juke
boxes alone have taken the jobs of approximately 8,000 live musicians. There are
approximately 500 radio stations which do not employ a single live musician. These
radio stations are all classified as big business. They say they need the services of the
American Federation of Musicians, but only in the canned kind of music. This part
of our business takes away several thousand more musicians who would be employed
if we did not make the canned music, to say nothing about the taverns and cafes
using Muzak, recordings, etc., etc. Members of the American Federation of Musi-
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casters, seeking to replace live talent with recordings, have often
acted as ruthlessly as their own interests seemed to require. The
Federation consequently has been compelled to reduce its function
to little more than that of compiling statistics as to the lost employ-
ment opportunities in the broadcasting industry.
The unilateral wishes and determinations of the employer, more-
over, inevitably become the decisive element in any statutory scheme
to prohibit unions from seeking the employment of unnecessary men
or the performance of unnecessary work. Whether the formal deci-
sion be lodged in a court, an administrative body or a jury, the prac-
tical situation is such as to render it unlikely that the adjudicators will
rely on much more than the employer's expressed desires. Indeed,
those desires are the very reason for anti-featherbedding legislation
and it is only natural that they form the heart of the statutory
standards.
Moreover, the objective and subjective criteria which fairly deter-
mine the appropriate number of men for any given job are so varied,
abstract and elusive as to preclude their condensation into any
standard usable by the statutory judges. Such relevant factors as the
financial resources of the employer, the complexity of the task, the
desired quality of the product, the skill of both those who manage
and those who labor, the employees' energy and cooperativeness, the
minimum requirements of safety, and a host of other considerations
are beyond the practical scope of an administrative or judicial hear-
ing pursuant to an anti-featherbedding statute. 21 And, of course,
cians received $3,000,000.00 annually for making canned music. This $3,000,000.00
worth of canned music, when distributed around the United States and Canada, takes
the place of live musicians who would receive for their work approximatey $100,-
000,000.00. Certainly no one can say this is a healthy condition." Letter from Petrillo
to James L. Fly, Chairman of Federation Communications Commission, July 30, 1942.
Since the foregoing letter was written, it has been estimated that the number of
radio stations that now employ no live musicians is 2,500. Cluesmann, The Support
of Live Music in an Electronic Age, 50 International Musician, No. 4, at 9 (Oct.,
1951). See also Countryman, The Organized Musicians: II, 16 Univ. Chi. L. Rev.
239 (1949); Petrillo, Dim Future for Musicians in TV, 51 International Musician,
No. 2, at 10 (Aug., 1952); New York Times, p. 14, col. 2 (Feb. 9, 1954).
21 Senator Taft repeatedly recognized the impossibility of having a court or board
determine the proper number of men for a job or the necessity of particular work
being performed. And he was particularly opposed to legislation which made the
desires of the employer paramount under the statutory scheme. At the time of the
passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, he stated that it would be "impracticable to give
to a board or a court the power to say that so many men are all right, and so many
men are too many." 93 Cong. Rec. 6441 (1947). In the 1953 hearings on amendments
to the Act, he stated that to give a board that power is to put it "into the actual
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any economic or social justification the union may have for its de-
mands is totally irrelevant in this setting. Hence it becomes natural
and inevitable to rely heavily on the employer's views, prejudiced
and incomplete though they may be.
It may be true, as a majority of the Supreme Court has held, that
the Lea Act satisfies the Fifth Amendment's requirement of definite-
ness in criminal statutes.22 Disagreeing with the contention "that
persons of ordinary intelligence would be unable to know when their
compulsive actions would force a person against his will to hire
employees he did not need,"23 the Court held that the statutory
language "provides an adequate warning as to what conduct falls
under its ban, and marks boundaries sufficiently distinct for judges
and juries to administer the law in accordance with the will of
Congress. '24
Yet the clarity of the language for constitutional purposes does
not make the statutory task of determining how many jobs are
"needed" any easier. It does not foreclose the fact that many of the
relevant factors cannot be confined within any meaningful standards
and that decisive weight will necessarily be given to management's
analysis of its own needs and requirements. The truth of the matter
is that proper resolution of these elusive considerations can only be
found in the give and take of the collective bargaining process, where
definite formulations are unnecessary and appropriate weight and
concessions can be given to the practicalities of the situation by the
operation of a thousand industries about which they know very little and are hardly
competent to decide" and that "I do not think we are going to let the employer
determine the number." Hearings before Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare on proposed revisions of Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 83d
Cong. 1st Sess. 258, 650 (1953).
22 United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 6-8 (1947).
23 Ibid., at 6.
24 Ibid., at 7. But the dissenting opinion of Justice Reed stated: "A statute is in-
valid when 'so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning.' 269 U.S. at 391. It seems to me that this vice exists in this section of the
challenged act. How can a man or a jury possibly know how many men are 'needed'
'to perform actual services' in broadcasting? What must the quality of the program
be? How skillful are the employees in the performance of their task? Does one
weigh the capacity of the employee or the managerial ability of the employer? Is
the desirability of short hours to spread the work to be evaluated? Or is the standard
the advantage in take-home pay for overtime work? . . .This is a criminal statute.
The principle that such statutes must be so written that intelligent men may know
what acts of theirs will jeopardize their life, liberty or property is of importance to
all. That principle requires, I think, a determination that this section of the Com-
munications Act is invalid." Ibid., at 17-18.
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parties most intimately concerned. The problem simply does not
lend itself to fair solution in a formal judicial arena.
Senator Taft recognized these realities in explaining the failure to
incorporate the Lea Act proscriptions into Section 8 (b) (6) of the
Taft-Hartley Act. It would be impracticable, he said, "to give to a
board or court the power to say that so many men are all right, and so
many men are too many. It would require a practical application of
the law by the courts in hundreds of different industries, and a deter-
mination of facts which it seemed to me would be almost impos-
sible."25
As a result of Senator Taft's views, Section 8 (b) (6) of the Taft-
Hartley Act became a relatively innocuous effort to curb one form of
union featherbedding. 6 It labels as an unfair labor practice only those
union efforts which "cause or attempt to cause an employer to pay or
deliver or agree to pay or deliver any money or other thing of value,
in the nature of an exaction, for services which are not performed or
not to be performed." Section 8 (b) (6), as described by Senator Taft,
affects merely the efforts of a union "to accept money for people who
do not work," a practice which he termed "a fairly clear case, easy to
determine" 27 and as bordering "definitely on extortion. ' 2
The Supreme Court has recently refused to expand Section 8 (b) (6)
beyond this narrow, limited meaning.29 As long as actual work is of-
fered or performed, even though the employer considers the work
25 93 Cong. Rec. 6441 (1947).
26The bill originally passed by the House had contained extensive provisions
relating to union featherbedding. Section 12(a) (3) (B) of H.R. 3020, 80th Cong.
1st Sess., outlawed certain featherbedding practices, defined in Section 2(17) to
incude any practice which has the effect of requiring an employer (1) to employ
more workers than are reasonably required, (2) to pay for services of more workers
than are reasonably required, (3) to pay more than once for services performed,
(4) to pay for services not to be performed, or (5) to pay a tax for the privilege
of using, making or selling any article or machine, or to impose any restriction on
its use. These provisions were drawn directly from the Lea Act but were discarded
by the joint House-Senate conference committee because of Senator Taft's view
that it was impracticable to have a board or court decide how many men are neces-
sary and because of the constitutional issues which were then unresolved. These
issues, which were involved in the Lea Act, resulted in the decision in United States
v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1947). See also Hartley, Our New National Labor Policy
156-157 (1948); Millis and Brown, From the Wagner Act to Taft-Hartley 478-480
(1950).
27 93 Cong. Rec. 6441 (1947).
2893 Cong. Rec. 6443 (1947).
29 American Newspaper Publishers Assn. v. NLRB, 345 U.S. 100 (1953); NLRB
v. Gamble Enterprises, Inc., 345 U.S. 117 (1953).
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unnecessary or needless, Section 8 (b) (6) does not apply. In the words
of the Court,8 0
where work is done by an employee, with the employer's consent, a labor
organization's demand that the employee be compensated for time spent in
doing the disputed work does not become an unfair labor practice. The trans-
action simply does not fall within the kind of featherbedding defined in the
statute.
And, said the Court,8 '
when an employer receives a bona fide offer of competent performance of
relevant services, it remains for the employer, through free and fair negotia-
tion, to determine whether such offer shall be accepted and what compensa-
tion shall be paid for the work done.
In other words, Section 8(b) (6) "now limits its condemnation to
instances where a labor organization or its agents exact pay from an
employer in return for services not performed or not to be
performed." 2
The Supreme Court's pronouncement gave immediate and powerful
impetus to the persistent demands that Section 8 (b) (6) be expanded
to Lea Act proportions. The United States Chamber of Commerce
proposed the outlawing of union demands for payments for "service"
which is undesired and unnecessary, even if the union offers to per-
form or actually performs such "service. '88 The National Association
of Manufacturers recommended that Section 8 (b) (6) be amended to
make it an unfair labor practice for a union to cause or attempt to
cause an employer to pay for the hiring of employees who "in his
80 American Newspaper Publishers Assn. v. NLRB, 345 U.S. 100, 110 (1953).
81 NLRB v. Gamble Enterprises, Inc., 345 U.S. 117, 123-124 (1953).
82 American Newspaper Publishers Assn. v. NLRB, 345 U.S. 100, 110 (1953).
Senator Taft subsequently indicated that the Court's construction of Section 8(b) (6)
was correct. In his words: "We purposely made it very narrow. We knew it was
very narrow. In fact it was so narrow that in 1949 I proposed to repeal the whole
thing. It seemed to me we either better repeal it or else try to work out some way
to make it much stronger. When you come to try to make it much stronger, you
run into practical difficulties. In effect, what you say is that the union cannot say
to the employer 'We want two mine inspectors,' because if they do they are
subjecting themselves to an unfair labor practice judgment. That seems to be rather
a radical position for us to take. If you do not do that, then you have to say some-
body will determine, the Board presumably, whether it is a reasonable demand or
not. Then you put the Board into the actual operation of a thousand industries
about which they know very little and are hardly competent to decide." Hearings
before Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on proposed revisions of
the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 83d Cong. 1st Sess. 258 (1953).
88 Hearings before Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on proposed
revisions of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 83d Cong. 1st Sess. 167
(1953).
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judgment" are not required or for the performance of services which
"in his judgment" need not be performed.8 4 Coupled with this latter
recommendation was the remark that "the employer is about the only
one who can judge as to the work to be performed and the people
required to do that work. '8 5
These and other similar proposals36 became codified in a bill in-
troduced by Representative Kearns in the House of Representatives,
a bill which would broaden Section 8 (b) (6) to make it applicable to
services which are not "necessary or required to be performed."3 7
Such proposals, like the featherbedding myth from which they are
spawned, constitute a menacing challenge to a basic concept of free-
dom that has always been implicit in our labor-management relations.
That concept teaches that the government-whether in the form of the
legislature, the court, the administrative body or the jury-shall not
dictate that one party must accept the other party's wish or desire as
to what shall be included in the employment relationship.
Since the featherbedding folklore traditionally believes in condemn-
ing the uneconomic practice of workers only, the passage of anti-
featherbedding legislation usually means that the employer groups for
the moment are dominant politically. They can demand-as they have
-that their employees be compelled by law to perform and receive
payment for only such work as the employers consider desirable or
indispensable. On the other hand, in the politically unlikely event of
the enactment of legislation making supreme the desires of workers
as to the proper number of employees or the necessity of certain
work, the situation would be equally intolerable. Employees would
then be in position to dictate to their employers, under threat of in-
voking governmental sanctions, that compensation be paid to a certain
number of employees an dthat certain work be performed. Either
34 Ibid., at 257, 274.
35 Ibid., at 258.
36 The American Newspaper Publishers Association, for example, proposed that
Section 8(b) (6) be amended so as to make it an unfair labor practice for a union
(a) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to pay any money, in the nature of
an exaction, for services which are not performed or which are not to be per-
formed, or for permission to use any process or machine, or (b) to cause or attempt
to cause an employer to agree not to use any process of machine unless the product
of such process or machine is reproduced by employees who are not employed on
such process or machine in the regular course of their employment, or (c) to cause
or attempt to cause an employer to enter into an agreement not to use any new
process or machine. Ibid., at 1267.
37 H.R. 3146, 83d Cong. 1st Sess. (1953).
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situation is, plainly, the direct antithesis of a democratic society. It is
either a throwback to feudalism or an acceptance of the basic trap-
pings of modern totalitarianism.
This outrageous assault upon the principles of freedom is not made
more palatable or justifiable by clothing it with elaborate provisions
for administrative procedure and judicial review. Giving a board or
a court the right to determine how many men are needed or what
work is necessary cannot destroy the fact that the needs or wishes of
either the employers or the employees must necessarily be decisive
under any statutory scheme. And under existing and proposed legis-
lation, the employers' desires are the dominant factors. Any board or
court is understandably influenced by that fact. Indeed, the more an
effort is made to give appropriate consideration to other factors the
more confused and futile the task becomes. Administrative and judi-
cial bodies simply are not equipped to formulate a decision which by
its very nature can be reached fairly only through the processes of
free and private collective bargaining. Hence, beneath the labyrinth
of procedures and rules must lie the ugly fact that by government
fiat the wishes of one of the parties to an economic dispute are being
imposed on the other.
Even if it were possible for an administrative agency or a judicial
body to articulate a fair and just determination, distilled from ap-
propriate consideration of all relevant factors and cognizant of all the
important elements of compromise and concession, the essential evil
would remain. The government then becomes the arbiter of the
productivity of our economic system. A free economy cannot long
survive such an atmosphere. It is but a short step removed from the
total power of government to determine what shall be produced and
who shall produce it.
Hardly a day goes by but that some union does not make a request
which calls for or necessarily requires the employment of additional
employees and which brings resistance from the employer on grounds
of efficiency, economy, benefit or utility. It has always been the
measure of our freedom and a tribute to our system of law that such
proposals are freely advanced and freely resisted without fear of
sovereign intrusion or restraint. In the vast preponderance of in-
stances, these issues are resolved by discussion, concession or com-
promise. And where stalemates develop, the parties are free to resort
to peaceful economic measures in defense of their positions.
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Such is the setting in which the featherbedding issues can best be
resolved. Indeed, it is the only setting in which to resolve them in a
manner consistent with our ideals of freedom. It permits unions to
assert their time-honored right to better the workers' standards of
living by fighting for what the unions believe will achieve that goal.
At the same time, the employers retain their equal right to resist any
demands which they may think unwarranted or unduly burdensome
or which they are merely unwilling to grant. The employers in turn
can make their own demands and suggestions, with the unions free
to oppose them or make concessions.
Without question, there have been unreasonable demands by both
employers and employees. But in a free society unreasonableness can
best be met by free and full discussion and negotiation, aided by the
bright light of publicity. To attempt to quench unreasonableness by
statutory force is to invite suppression of both the reasonable and the
unreasonable and to destroy some basic values that keep our society
free.
